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CHAPTER 1 
Transformation of Kenya’s 
Banking Sector, 2000–2012
RADHA UPADHYAYA AND SUSAN JOHNSON
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1 Introduction and motivation
The finance for growth literature emphasises the long-run positive relationship 
between finance and economic growth (Levine, 1997; Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine, 2001). However there is now an acceptance that this relationship 
has important ‘non-linear effects’ (Beck, 2013) and that ‘we cannot carry on 
assuming that more finance is better’ (Griffith-Jones, 2013). Furthermore, it 
has now been recognised that it is not only foreign banks, but also local banks, 
that are important drivers of  credit growth, access to finance for the poor 
and innovation (Lin, 2009). It is within the context of  these debates that this 
chapter discusses the evolution of  the banking sector in Kenya. 
The changes in the Kenyan banking sector since colonial times 
largely mirror the country’s political and economic transformation 
from a colony into an independent nation. The pre-independence 
period was characterised by a small banking sector with foreign-
owned banks that predominantly extracted profits out of  the colony. 
The post-independence era from 1963 to 2000 had three phases that reflect 
the growing pains of  a newly independent nation. The first phase (‘Harambee’), 
from 1963 to 1980, saw the creation of  government-owned banks. The next 
phase (‘Nyayo’) was characterised by a large increase in banks and non-banking 
financial institutions (NBFIs) including the creation of  local banks, several 
of  which had strong political connections.1 The next phase (‘Liberalisation’), 
from 1990 to 1999, saw an explosion in the growth of  banks but was also 
characterised by instability, with a large number of  bank failures. Therefore, 
while liberalisation had some positive effects including an increase in the levels 
of  deposits, the overall results of  liberalisation were largely disappointing both 
in terms of  the depth and the stability of  the financial sector. Furthermore, 
financial access was not a major consideration for commercial banks or the 
Central Bank of  Kenya. 
The next phase (‘Transformation’), from 2000 to 2012, is the focus of  this 
chapter. One of  the impetuses for this phase was changes in the regulatory 
environment in 2000. Among these key changes were an increase in minimum 
capital requirements, the reinforcement of  single borrower limits and restricted 
lending to insiders. 
Authors’ note: The authors would like to thank Mr. Ochieng Oloo of  Think Business Ltd and Mr. Ashif  Kassam of  RSM 
Ashvir Ltd for sharing their datasets on the financial statements of  banks in Kenya. The authors would also like to thank 
participants at the Kenyan Financial Transformation (2006–2014) workshop at FSD Kenya, Nairobi on 13–14 June 
2014, and an anonymous referee for useful comments. The views expressed here remain the authors’ own.
1 Harambee and Nyayo were the terms used by the first and second presidents of  Kenya, President Jomo Kenyatta and 
President Daniel Arap Moi, to capture the philosophy of  their leadership. 
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The chapter shows that the banking sector in Kenya transformed significantly 
during this period, with increased depth, stability and access. The chapter also 
shows that the composition of  the banking sector changed significantly during 
this period. The transformation has been led by local large privately owned 
banks that have pursued expansionary strategies, including developing products 
for small and medium-sized enterprises and a focus on the ‘unbanked’. 
However, the chapter highlights that key challenges remain, including (i) 
high interest rate spreads; (ii) a decreasing proportion of  lending going to key 
economic sectors including agriculture and manufacturing; and (iii) slower 
transformation of  local small privately owned banks.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a historical perspective 
on the banking sector in Kenya, summarising the major changes in the banking 
sector from 1896 to 2000. Section 3 analyses the changes that took place in 
the banking sector as a whole in the period 2000–2012. Section 4 discusses the 
changes in the industry composition and focuses on the segmented nature of  
the banking sector in Kenya. It also highlights the rise of  local large privately 
owned banks and their contribution to increased financial access. Section 5 
concludes.2 
2 History of the banking sector – 1896 to 2000
2.1 Colonial origins – 1896 to 1950
The establishment of  the British Empire in East Africa began with the 
establishment of  a trading frontier under the agency of  the Imperial British 
East Africa Company (IBEAC), incorporated in the United Kingdom in 1888. 
IBEAC sought to inherit the centuries-old long-distance trade that linked the 
African interior to the African coast, and the African coast to the Indian sub-
continent via the Indian Ocean. Colonial rule was formally established with 
the declaration of  the East African Protectorate in 1895 under the sovereignty 
of  the Sultan of  Zanzibar. Construction of  the Uganda Railway (later the East 
African Railway) began in 1896 from the East African coast at Mombasa and 
reached the point that would become the capital of  modern Kenya, Nairobi, 
2 The data sources for this chapter are listed in Appendix 1. For aggregate-level indicators, we have used data that 
are publicly available from the World Bank website and the Central Bank of  Kenya (CBK) website. Data on banks’ 
financial statements are also publicly available, as banks are required to publish their financial statements quarterly 
in the Kenyan press. However, these bank-level data are not available in a database from the CBK website. We have 
therefore relied on two companies – Think Business and RSM Ashvir – that collate the publicly available data into 
a database and use the data to present annual awards for banks. The dataset was randomly checked against original 
bank balance sheets to confirm its veracity. 
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in May 1898. In 1920, the nominal sovereignty of  the Sultan of  Zanzibar 
was confined to a ten-mile strip along the coast, which the British then rented 
from the Sultan. The country was renamed the Colony and Protectorate of  
Kenya (Hazlewood, 1979; Atieno-Odhiambo, 2000). 
The origins of  commercial banking in Kenya lie in these commercial 
connections between British East Africa and British India at the close of  the 
19th century. The first two British banks to be established were the National 
Bank of  India in 1896 and the Standard Bank of  South Africa in 1910. The 
former became National and Grindlays Bank and the latter became Standard 
Chartered Bank. The National Bank of  South Africa was established in 1916 
but was later merged with Colonial Bank and Anglo-Egyptian Bank to form 
Barclays Bank (Dominion, Colonial and Overseas) in 1926, which was also 
based in London. 
The most important point to recognise is that while commercial banking 
became relatively well established in Kenya during the colonial period, the 
banks showed little interest in the indigenous African population. As branches 
of  metropolitan banks, they were designed to settle accounts of  the colonial 
economy and were therefore not interested in encouraging savings amongst 
Africans or financing African enterprise (Engberg, 1965; Mkandawire, 1999). 
It has been further argued that the banks did little to help even their main 
customer base – the white settler community that was dominated by farmers:
‘… these banks lent money to the farmers at [interest rates of] anything 
from 8 to 10 per cent. When crisis came [after the First World War] 
they operated their traditional policy and shut down on credit at the 
moment when it was most required. When European farmers were 
mortgaged to the hilt and the wages of  Africans were at least halved, 
these banks remained woefully prosperous. Throughout the crisis the 
Standard Bank of  South Africa did not declare a dividend of  no less 
than 10 per cent… A good deal of  property as well as money passed 
into their hands during these years. Organised to take money out of  the 
colony, there is little evidence that the banks have proved adventurous 
in promoting industrial development in Kenya.’ Aaronovitch and 
Aaronovitch (1947, p. 177)3 
Interestingly, the restriction of  credit by the three banks led to pressure on 
the government to relieve the heavily indebted white farmers. The colonial 
government established the Land Bank in 1931 as a source of  alternative 
credit. However, it has been observed that the private banks benefited more 
3 Emphasis added. 
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than farmers, as 39% of  the funds of  the Land Bank were used to discharge 
existing mortgages with private banks and therefore did not increase the total 
availability of  credit (Aaronovitch and Aaronovitch, 1947). 
2.2 Pre-independence growth – 1950 to 1963
It was not until the 1950s that other banks began to be established. These 
were mainly single branch banks, headquartered in Nairobi with a focus on 
trade finance (Engberg, 1965; Central Bank of  Kenya, 1976). 
There are other structural features that should be noted. First, there was 
no central bank fulfilling the function of  lender of  last resort. In its place 
was the East African Currency Board (EACB) with the limited function of  
maintaining a strict parity between the East African shilling and the British 
pound.4 Therefore, the supply of  credit was fully determined by the commercial 
banks. Commercial bank advances consisted of  their own resources and funds 
borrowed from parent banks. Funds moved freely from parent banks to their 
branches, as there were no capital account restrictions. Second, prudential 
regulation was very lenient with no statutory liquidity or cash requirement 
ratios (Central Bank of  Kenya, 1976, 1986).5 Third, there was very little effort 
amongst the banks to compete for deposits. Interest rates on deposits and loans 
were determined by collective  (cartel-type) bank arrangements decided by 
the three major banks and subscribed to by the other banks (Engberg, 1965). 
Between 1950 and 1963, the levels of  deposits, assets and loans held by 
commercial banks in East Africa (and therefore Kenya) grew substantially 
(see Table 1).
4 The establishment of  the EACB in 1919 led to the introduction of  the East African florin in 1920 and the East 
African shilling in 1922. Prior to that, the currency of  use in East Africa was the Indian rupee, due to centuries-old 
trade connections between India and East Africa. However the fluctuations in the value of  the rupee in relation to 
sterling during the First World War led to the establishment of  the EACB (Central Bank of  Kenya, 1976). The Board, 
operating through commercial banks, issued shillings at a fixed exchange rate of  20 East African shillings for every 
£1. The Board had all its assets in UK securities and all its currency issues had to be fully backed by foreign exchange 
(Hazlewood, 1979).
5 The first three banks to be established during the colonial period were regulated by the Banking Ordinance of  1910. 
This Act was repealed and replaced by the Banking Ordinance of  1956, which specified for the first time minimum 
capital requirements for banks and established a Registrar of  Banks with power to license banks. The minimum 
capital was set at 2 million East African shillings (approximately US$0.28 million).  
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Table 1: Monetisation, assets and deposits held by banks in East Africa,  
1950–1963
Year
Total 
deposits 
(£m)
Local earning 
assets 
(£m)
Local earning 
assets as % of 
total deposits
Loans and 
advances 
(£m)
Loans and 
advances as % of 
total deposits
1950 64 22 34% 17 27%
1960 87 78 90% 69 80%
1963 121 105 87% 93 77%
Note: It has not been possible to get a breakdown of these figures between the three East African countries (Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanzania). 
Source: Engberg (1965).
It has been documented that the banks tended to be very conservative, applying 
credit standards set by their head offices that were not realistic in the extremely 
under-developed countries in which they were operating (Engberg, 1965). 
The unwillingness of  banks to extend credit led to a situation in the 1950s 
where there was an export of  capital from the under-developed periphery to 
the developed metropole (Maxon, 1992). 
The second important point to note is that the safety of  the deposits held by the 
branches of  the main banks did not depend on the quality of  assets of  these 
banks in East Africa, but was linked to the capital and reserves of  the parent 
banks overseas. Therefore, when large withdrawals of  deposits took place in 
1955, 1960 and 1963, the banks were able to use the inter-bank borrowing 
facilities of  their London head office (Abdi, 1977). This point is crucial to keep 
in mind for our discussion below on segmentation – foreign banks had already 
established a reputation as ‘safe banks’ before independence. 
On 30 June 1963, on the eve of  independence, there were nine banks operating 
in Kenya.6 Table 2 lists these banks.  
6 The financial sector also included three private NBFIs: Diamond Jubilee Investment Trust established in 1946; 
Credit Finance Corporation established in 1955; and National Industrial Credit established in 1959. In addition, 
there were two private housing finance companies: Savings and Loans established in 1949; and East African Building 
Society established in 1959 (Central Bank of  Kenya, 1972, 1986). Though it has not been possible to find the exact 
figures for the asset bases of  these financial companies at independence, it would be reasonable to assume that they 
were very small compared to the banks. These NBFIs were restricted from raising deposits and were also single 
branch institutions.  
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Table 2: Banks operating in Kenya in 1963
Nationality (place 
of incorporation)
Date of 
incorporation
Barclays D.C.&O. (presently Barclays Bank) British 1896
National and Grindlays (presently Kenya Commercial Bank) British 1910
Standard Bank (presently Standard Chartered Bank) British 1916
Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij Dutch 1951
Bank of India Indian 1953
Bank of Baroda Indian 1953
Habib Bank (Overseas) Ltd Pakistani 1956
Ottoman Bank Turkish 1958
Commercial Bank of Africa Tanzanian 1958
Notes: It has not been possible to establish the exact size of these banks in terms of asset base in 1963. However, 
Barclays D.C.&O. was the largest in terms of asset size (Onyonka, 1968, quoted in Maxon, 1992). 
Source: Engberg (1965) and Central Bank of Kenya (1986).
In summary, at independence in 1963, the first three banks to be established in 
Kenya continued to dominate the banking sector, controlling about 85% of  the 
total branch network (Engberg, 1965). It is also important to note that the data 
in Table 2 highlight that at independence, all banks were foreign owned and 
there were no banks that could be termed ‘local’. Furthermore, all non-bank 
financial institutions were British owned except Diamond Jubilee Investment 
Trust, which was the only financial institution whose ownership could be 
termed ‘local’ at independence.7 Finally, all financial institutions primarily 
concerned themselves with trade finance and had very little interest in lending. 
2.3 Harambee: The creation of government-owned banks – 1963 to 1980
The post-independence bank developments started with the establishment of  
the Central Bank of  Kenya (CBK) in 1966 after the dissolution of  the EACB. 
Kenya’s first national currency – the Kenyan shilling (KSh) – was introduced 
on 14 September 1966 at the rate of  KSh20 to the pound (Central Bank of  
Kenya, 1976). At independence in 1963, the prevalent understanding was that 
development entailed massive resource mobilisation and banks were seen as key 
instruments in this. However, in Kenya, unlike in most other African countries, 
there was no wholesale nationalisation of  the banks. This can be seen as part 
7 Diamond Jubilee Investment Trust was set up by members of  the Ismaili community (a sub-community of  the Asian-
African community) to commemorate the Diamond Jubilee (60th anniversary) of  leadership of  His Highness Aga 
Khan III of  the community.
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of  the broader strategy by Kenyan leaders at independence to accommodate 
colonial interests and prevent a wholesale migration of  foreign capital (Leys, 
1975). At independence, the first president Jomo Kenyatta assured the white 
settler community:
‘The Government of  independent Kenya will not be a gangster 
Government. Those who have been panicky…can now rest assured 
that the future African Government…will not deprive them of  their 
property rights of  ownership. We will encourage investors…to come to 
Kenya… to bring prosperity to this country.’ Quoted in Ndege (2000, 
p. 107) and Hazlewood (1979, p. 13).
Therefore international banks – now classified as foreign-owned banks – 
including Barclays D.C.&O. and Standard Bank continued to operate in 
Kenya.8 Only National and Grindlays Bank was bought out by the Government 
of  Kenya (GoK) and became the Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB) (Central 
Bank of  Kenya, 1986).9 In 1974, two US banks were established – the First 
National Bank of  Chicago and the First National City Bank of  New York 
(Nasibi, 1992). 
In the 1960s, Kenya experienced impressive economic growth, mainly driven 
by the commercialisation of  African smallholder agriculture. In the first decade 
of  independence, GDP at constant prices grew at an annual rate of  7.1% 
(Hazlewood, 1979).  The M2-to-GDP ratio increased from 19% in 1963 to 
30% in 1970 (Central Bank of  Kenya, 1986). However, the government was 
dissatisfied with the pace of  adjustment, in particular with the very low loans-
to-deposit ratio of  64.6% in 1969 (Republic of  Kenya, 1968).10  It was argued 
that:
‘… the urgency of  development is so great, that the need for specialized 
institutions for the collection of  savings and investment cannot be left 
to the process of  slow evolution.’ Republic of  Kenya (1968, p. 558).
8 In the 1970s, Standard Bank became Standard Chartered Bank Ltd and Barclays Bank D.C.&O changed its name to 
Barclays Bank International Ltd, both becoming wholly owned subsidiaries of  the parent banks in London (Central 
Bank of  Kenya, 1976). 
9 This was part of  the resource mobilisation and ‘Africanisation’ strategy of  the government discussed below. The 
purchase of  National and Grindlays Bank was on a willing seller, willing buyer basis. In 1968, the Ottoman Bank 
was taken over by National and Grindlays Bank. Then in 1970, an agreement was reached between National and 
Grindlays Bank and the government. The bank was split into an international bank in which the government took a 
40% share, and the local branch system of  the bank, renamed Kenya Commercial Bank, in which the government 
took a 60% share. The remaining shares were quoted on the London and Nairobi stock exchanges, respectively 
(Hazlewood, 1979). 
10 The loans-to-deposit ratio in 1969 was even lower than the 1963 figure of  77%. 
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There was an understanding that economic development entailed massive 
resource mobilisation, and that these resources could be raised through banks. 
There was also the political reality that needed to be addressed – the need 
for visible ownership in the Kenyan economy by African Kenyans – and 
the government’s stated policy of  ‘Africanisation’ was also pursued through 
the financial system. The government also established two new banks – Co-
operative Bank of  Kenya and National Bank of  Kenya – in 1968. Specialised 
credit institutions, or development finance institutions (DFIs) – including the 
Industrial & Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC), the Industrial 
Development Bank (IBD), the Development Finance Corporation of  Kenya 
(DFCK) and the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) – were set up to 
give loans to Kenyans and also to purchase shares in public corporations 
(Grosh, 1991). 11  
There was also growth of  local financial institutions, termed ‘indigenous’ 
banks. Between 1971 and 1980, one local private bank and nine local NBFIs 
were established (Kariuki, 1993). These financial institutions were mainly 
owned by African (Kikuyu) businessmen who had built up capital during the 
coffee boom of  1976–1979 due to their close links to President Kenyatta, who 
was also from the Kikuyu ethnic group (Throup, 1987). The commercial banks 
and NBFIs were largely free from regulatory controls, except the stipulation of  
lending and deposit interest rates (Brownbridge, 1998). There was a condition 
that banks should extend credit to agriculture amounting to 17% of  their 
deposits, but this requirement was rarely enforced (Kariuki, 1993). 
The M2-to-GDP ratio throughout the 1970s and 1980s remained at 
approximately 30%. There was some financial deepening, however, as the 
loans-to-deposits ratio grew from 64.6% in 1969 to 80% by 1980. The ratio 
of  financial institutions’ (banks and NBFIs) assets to GDP grew from 28% in 
1971 to 40% in 1980 (Ngugi, 2000).12 
2.4 Nyayo: The rise of indigenous and political banks – 1980 to 1990
When President Kenyatta died in 1978, he was succeeded by President Moi, 
who was from the Kalenjin community.  The watchword chosen by Moi for 
his presidency was Nyayo (meaning ‘footsteps’), emphasising continuity with the 
11 ICDC was originally incorporated in 1954 as Industrial Development Corporate (IDC) to assist and encourage 
medium- and large-scale investment in the industrial sector. In 1973, IDB was set up as a subsidiary of  ICDC. 
However, ICDC, DFCK and IDB had overlapping and duplicating roles (Grosh, 1991). 
12 It should be noted that this ratio is different from the private credit-to-GDP ratio, as it includes public as well as 
private lending and also includes liquid assets which are not lent out. 
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economic policies of  the Kenyatta era by remaining committed to a capitalist 
economy with a focus on attracting foreign investment and maintaining policies 
of  Africanisation of  the economy (Maxon and Ndege, 1995).
The 1980s witnessed a large growth in the number of  NBFIs from 20 in 1980 
to 53 in 1990 (a rise of  165%). The number of  banks also grew from 17 to 24 
(a rise of  17%).13 The majority of  these new financial institutions were owned 
by local entrepreneurs (Kariuki, 1993). These local banks fulfilled a very useful 
function, as they catered for mainly small and medium-sized enterprises, often 
from their own communities, that the foreign-owned and government-owned 
banks did not serve (Nasibi, 1992). 
However the proliferation of  local banks and NBFIs was also facilitated by 
several political and regulatory factors. First, regulatory barriers – including the 
minimum capital requirements and reserve ratios – were very low compared to 
banks (Brownbridge, 1998). In particular, the minimum capital requirements 
for NBFIs were extremely low even though they were allowed to take deposits.14 
There was a regulatory ‘arbitrage’ between banks and NBFIs, and most 
banks (including foreign-owned and government-owned banks) started an 
NBFI as a subsidiary to take advantage of  this regulatory loophole.15 Second, 
political interference subverted prudential criteria in the awarding of  licenses, 
as Section 53 of  the Banking Act gave the minister of  finance authority to 
grant exemptions to the Act (Brownbridge, 1998).16 Third, many banks had 
prominent politicians on their boards and were able to use these connections 
to obtain public sector deposits very cheaply (Ndii, 1994; Brownbridge, 1998). 
Fourth, the CBK had very little capacity to supervise the growth of  non-bank 
financial institutions (World Bank, 1989). As will be seen below, these factors 
sowed the seeds of  weakness in the banking system from the very establishment 
of  these NBFIs. 
Furthermore, during the first decade of  the Moi era, due to external and 
internal economic factors, Kenya experienced a severe reduction in GDP 
growth and macroeconomic imbalances, including declining terms of  trade 
13 See Table 3. It should be noted that it has been difficult to get data on the exact number of  banks that opened and 
closed each year. In particular, it has been difficult to establish the exact number of  banks in 1983 prior to large 
number of  bank failures in 1984. Therefore, these trend figures do not capture the full details of  the movements in 
the number of  banks. 
14 From 1963 to 1980, the minimum share capital for banks remained KSh2 million and the minimum share capital of  
NBFIs was KSh500,000 (Brownbridge, 1998). See Table 4 for a list of  capital requirements of  the Central Bank of  
Kenya from 1956 onwards. 
15 This policy was reversed in 1993, as will be discussed below. 
16 The Banking Act is Chapter 488 of  the Laws of  Kenya; the Central Bank of  Kenya Act is Chapter 491 of  the Laws 
of  Kenya (see www.centralbank.go.ke).
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and budget deficits, and was forced into undertaking structural adjustment 
policies recommended by the IMF and the World Bank (Ngugi, 2000).17  
The banking system was repressed according to the McKinnon-Shaw 
hypothesis, as interest rates up to the early 1980s were low and negative in 
real terms (Mwega et al., 1990). It was acknowledged that:
‘it had been official policy in Kenya since independence to follow a ‘low 
interest rate policy’ in order to encourage investment and to protect the 
small borrower.’ Central Bank of  Kenya (1986, p. 54)
The main structural adjustment policy relating to the financial sector was a 
gradual increase in interest rates, and real lending rates of  banks increased 
from -2.5% in 1980 to 9% in 1990 (Brownbridge, 1998).
The rapid rise of  financial institutions, very poor regulation, shifting political 
economy trends and also declining economic growth resulted in the failure of  
12 banks between 1984 and 1989 (see Table 3). In December 1989, nine of  
these banks were taken over by the government to form the Consolidated Bank 
(Ngugi, 2000).18 A more detailed discussion on the reasons for bank failures, 
in particular the political economy shifts, is presented below. In 1989, there 
was a major amendment to the Banking Act and Central Bank of  Kenya Act 
establishing stricter guidelines for the licensing of  institutions and establishing 
single borrower limits (Nasibi, 1992). 19 In 1989, the Deposit Protection Fund 
Board was also established to compensate small depositors in case of  bank 
failures. This institution also assumed responsibility for liquidating failed banks 
(Nasibi, 1992). 
This section has shown that the banking sector in Kenya immediately prior 
to full-scale liberalisation in the 1990s was fragile. Despite the increase in the 
number of  financial institutions to 94 in 1990, the M2-to-GDP ratio and the 
loans-to-deposits ratio of  banks remained constant throughout the 1980s at 
about 30% and 80% respectively. Furthermore, the ratio of  total financial 
17 The main external factor was the oil price shocks of  1973 and 1979 and the key internal factor was the drought of  
1979 and 1984 (Ngugi and Kabubo, 1998). From an average rate of  7.1% (mentioned above), GDP growth fell to 
3.9% in 1980 and then to a low of  0.8% in 1984, but grew again to 5% by 1989.
18 These are Union Bank, Jimba Credit Corporation, Estate Finance, Estate Building Society, Business Finance, 
Nationwide Finance, Kenya Savings and Mortgages, Home Savings and Mortgages, and Citizens Building Society 
(Nasibi, 1992; Brownbridge, 1998). 
19 The Central Bank of  Kenya Act was only tinkered with from 1969 to 1984. In 1985, it was overhauled. The key 
amendments were that first, applications for the license of  banks had to go through the CBK and not directly to 
the Minister of  Finance; second, minimum capital requirements were increased to KSh15 million; and third, single 
borrower limits were set at 100% of  share capital (Central Bank of  Kenya, 1986). See Table 4 for a list of  changes to 
capital requirements through the years. 
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institutions’ assets to GDP rose only marginally from 40% in 1980 to 41.6% 
in 1989 (Central Bank of  Kenya, 1986; Ngugi, 2000).20 
2.5 Liberalisation – 1990 to 1999
Following the structural adjustment programmes of  the 1980s, which were 
focused on debt and budget reform and only contained minor financial 
sector reforms, Kenya embarked on full-scale financial liberalisation in the 
1990s. Unlike other African countries, the official reports of  the Kenyan 
government lauded the success of  the structural adjustment programmes of  
the 1980s (Nasibi, 1992).21 Liberalisation of  the financial sector was financed 
by the World Bank’s Financial Sector Adjustment Credit (FSAC), which was 
approved by the Board of  the World Bank in June 1989. The theoretical 
basis of  financial liberalisation was the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis, in which 
government control of  interest rates was seen as a key constraint to financial 
sector development.22 
The key step of  full-scale financial liberalisation was the complete deregulation 
of  interest rates in 1991 (Brownbridge, 1998).  In 1992, commercial banks were 
authorised to deal in foreign exchange, and in 1993 a market-determined flexible 
exchange rate system was adopted for the Kenyan shilling (Brownbridge, 1998). 
While liberalisation was taking place, big political changes were also taking 
place and in 1992, Kenya had its first multi-party elections. President Moi was 
returned to power due to an extremely fractured opposition. However, funding 
the elections left the public finances in disarray. In particular, government 
borrowing jumped and this is reflected in the Treasury bill rates. In March 
1993, the 91-day Treasury bill rate was 25%. This jumped to 46% in April 
20 Ngugi (2000) argues that this is because the M2/GDP figure does not take into account assets and liabilities of  NBFIs. 
She shows that NBFI assets as a percentage of  GDP grew from 12.1% in 1980 to 22% in 1984, but dropped again 
to 14.5% in 1989, while bank assets as a percentage of  GDP were constant at around 28% throughout the decade. 
However, she does not give a figure of  the loan-to-deposit ratio of  NBFIs. It is estimated that the M3-to-GNP ratio 
increased from 38% in 1973 to 45% in 1985 (Mwega et al., 1990).  
21 It should be noted that in Kenya, the clamour for liberalisation was not only external. Leaders of  the private sector, 
including several chairmen of  the Kenya Association of  Manufacturers (the principal manufacturing and trade 
lobby group), were calling for a deregulation of  interest rates and commodity prices (Nasibi, 1992). Though it 
should also be noted that there were differences in positions between export-oriented manufacturers, such as textile 
manufacturers, who opposed the liberalisation and import-oriented manufacturers who lobbied for the liberalisation. 
22 The references to the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis are explicit. The objectives of  financial liberalisation were stated 
as:
‘to encourage mobilisation of  savings and contribute to the maintenance of  financial stability...and to ensure 
that funds flow into those areas which are most productive, and that the biases which have existed against 
lending to small business are eliminated.’ Central Bank of  Kenya (1988, p. 18), quoted in Kariuki (1995, 
p. 6). 
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1993, peaked at 85% in July 1993, and then dropped steadily but remained 
still very high at 44% in December 1993.23   
This liberalisation of  interest rates and exchange rates provided further avenues 
for local banks to compete with more established banks, and was an added 
stimulus for local bank entry (Brownbridge, 1998; Ndung’u and Ngugi, 1999). 
While the 1980s witnessed the rise of  African (mainly Kikuyu) banks, the late 
1980s and 1990s witnessed the rise of  several African (Kalenjin) and Asian-
African banks.24 By the mid-1990s, it is estimated that local banks controlled 
about a quarter of  the market (Brownbridge, 1998).25 Table 3 shows the growth 
in the total number of  financial institutions from 1990 to 1993. The total 
number of  banks grew by 67% and the total number of  NBFIs by 13%. 
Table 3: Number of financial institutions in Kenya, 1963–2000
1963 1975 1980 1990 1993 1994 1997 1998 2000
Banks 9 14 17 24 40 37 53 53 49
NBFIs 3 8 20 53 60 44 19 15 5
Building 
Societies
2 2 2 17 11 6 6 4 4
Total 14 22 39 94 111 87 78 72 58
Source:  Engberg (1965); Brownbridge (1998); Central Bank of Kenya (2000a, 2003, 2005).
However, as will be shown below, the experience with liberalisation in terms 
of  financial deepening was very unsatisfactory. 
After 1994, there was a decline in the total number of  institutions. This was 
partly due to the failure of  15 financial institutions in 1993. Furthermore, 
in 1993 the Central Bank of  Kenya adopted a universal banking policy and 
reduced the regulatory advantages that were available to NBFIs. This led to 
several NBFIs converting to banks or merging with their parent bank, and to 
a consolidation of  the banking sector (Ngugi, 2000). However, towards the 
end of  the 1990s, the banking sector still remained fairly fragile and six more 
banks were put under CBK statutory management towards the end of  1998. 
23 Data for Kenyan GDP growth rates, inflation rates, exchanges rates and T-bill rates from 1990–2005 are displayed 
in Appendix 7.
24 The Asian-African community is a new label of  identity used by people of  Indian origin who settled in Kenya (Asian-
African Heritage Trust, 2000). This community is often also referred to as Kenyan-Asians, East African-Asians or 
South Asian-Kenyans. 
25 It has not been possible to get disaggregated data at the segment level on banks’ assets for the periods before 2000. 
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3 Banking sector industry trends, 2000–2012
The banking sector as a whole changed significantly during this period, 
facilitated by regulatory changes, the rise of  large locally owned private banks 
and increased competition.
3.1 Regulatory changes
Throughout the late 1990s and up to 2000, the CBK Act and the Banking Act 
were amended to improve regulation and supervision of  banks.26 In October 
1995, key amendments included the harmonisation of  banks’ accounting 
financial years, the approval of  bank auditors by the CBK and the reduction 
of  the single borrower limit to core capital ratio from 100% to 25% (Central 
Bank of  Kenya, 1995, 1996).27 In 1997, the responsibilities for appointing the 
governor and the management of  the CBK were transferred to a board of  
directors appointed by the president, rather than directly by the minister of  
finance, in order to reduce political interference in the Bank (Central Bank of  
Kenya, 1997). In response to another spate of  bank failures in 1998, several 
changes were brought into force in 1999. Detailed guidelines on provisioning 
for non-performing loans were set out and a requirement was established for 
banks to publish their accounts, including details on their non-performing 
loans, in the national press (Central Bank of  Kenya, 1999). Minimum capital 
was increased to KSh200 million by December 1999. In October 2000, 
minimum capital requirements were increased to Ksh250 million. Table 4 
summarises the changes in the minimum capital requirements for banks in 
Kenya from 1956 onwards. 
Also in October 2000, guidelines were issued requiring banks to conform to 
the Basel Capital Accord in terms of  the composition of  capital, and also new 
regulatory capital ratios were specified. The October 2000 guidelines also 
reinforced the single borrower limits to 25% of  core capital, restricted lending 
to insiders to 20% of  core capital, defined a large exposure as 10% of  core 
capital, and further restricted lending to all large borrowers to five times the 
core capital (Central Bank of  Kenya, 2000b).
26 President Moi did not contest the December 2002 elections and in 2003, President Mwai Kibai became the third 
president of  Kenya as head of  NARC (the National Rainbow Coalition), a coalition of  parties of  which the two 
largest were the NAK (National Alliance Party of  Kenya) and LDP (Liberal Democratic Party of  Kenya). 
27 The single borrower limit is aimed at reducing exposure to one borrower. The previous limit of  100% meant that a 
single non-performing loan to one borrower could wipe out the entire capital of  a bank. 
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Table 4: Regulatory minimum capital requirements for banks in Kenya,  
1956–2012
Year KSh million US$ million
1956–68 2 0.28–0.28
1968–80 2 0.28–0.27
1980–82 5 0.67–0.46
1982–85 10 0.92–0.61
1985–92 15 0.91–0.41
1992–1999 75 2.07–1.37
31/12/1999 200 2.74
31/12/2000 250 3.20
31/12/2005 250 3.45
31/12/2009 350 4.61
31/12/2010 500 6.2
31/12/2011 700 8.7
31/12/2012 1000 12.4
Source: Brownbridge (1998), Central Bank of Kenya  (2000b, 2006, 2008).28
The Central Bank of  Kenya also passed regulations allowing the establishment 
of  credit registries. The legislation was tabled in Parliament in 2006 and 
passed as a Bill in 2008.  In 2009, the first company – Credit Reference 
Bureau Africa Limited  – was licensed to operate a credit reference bureau 
and began operations in July 2010. In 2011, a second company, Metropol 
Credit Reference Bureau Limited, was licensed. 
As will be seen below, following the introduction of  these guidelines and the 
high levels of  provisioning undertaken by banks, non-performing loans have 
fallen.
The Central Bank of  Kenya also brought in regulations that enabled innovation 
in the banking sector, in particular regulations on agent banking enacted in 
2011. Agent banking is an arrangement by which licensed institutions (banks 
and microfinance banks) engage third parties to offer specified banking services 
on behalf  of  the institution. In Kenya, agent banking is governed by the 
Prudential Guideline on Agent Banking (CBK/PG/15). As will be seen below, 
this has enabled banks to increase access to finance throughout the country.
28 The minimum capital requirements were stipulated in Kenyan shillings and remained constant during each of  the 
periods. The dollar value fluctuates depending on the exchange rate and the values quoted are for the beginning and 
end of  the period. 
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In the rest of  this section, we discuss general trends in the financial sector in 
Kenya, focusing on depth, efficiency, stability and access. 
3.2 Changes in financial sector depth 
Kenya has experienced steady increases in GDP growth, with the exceptions 
of  2002 and 2008 when there was very low growth linked to election-related 
political instability (see Figure 1). Kenya has also experienced some increases 
in investment, with gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of  GDP 
increasing from 16.71% in 2000 to 20.39% in 2012, with a dip between 2002 
and 2004.
The key area for concern is the savings rate. The ratio of  domestic savings to 
GDP increased from 7.28% in 2000 to 10.2% in 2005, but has fallen steadily 
since to 2.9% in 2012. As we will see below, the financial sector has steadily 
deepened since 2000, but this growth is not translating into an increase in 
gross savings. It should be noted that a key argument of  the McKinnon-Shaw 
theories that formed the basis of  financial liberalisation was that a freely 
determined market rate of  interest would increase deposits and, in turn, savings 
(McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). However, the experience of  most countries 
post liberalisation has been similar to that of  Kenya – financial liberalisation 
and an increase in financial depth have not led to an increase in savings – and 
it has been recognised that the causal nexus between finance and savings still 
has to be clarified (Mavrotas, 2005).29 This raises a key concern, as Kenya’s 
Vision 2030 goals entail a significant increase in domestic savings to 30% by 
2030 with an explicit view that this increase in savings will be propelled by 
the financial sector (Republic of  Kenya, 2007).
Kenya has also experienced growth in all three main indicators of  financial 
deepening (Figure 2). The liquid liabilities-to-GDP ratio steadily increased 
from 37.5% in 2000 to 47.4% in 2011. Similarly, the deposits-to-GDP ratio 
also increased from 29.5% in 2000 to 42.5% in 2011. The private credit-to-
GDP ratio has not exhibited a similar increase. It hovered around 27% but 
experienced some growth from 2008, rising to 33.6% in 2011. Overall it 
can be argued that the country has made good strides in terms of  increasing 
financial depth.
29 The causal nexus between savings and growth has also been questioned, with some economists suggesting that the 
causation may run in the opposite direction – from growth to savings; see Mavrotas (2005) for a summary of  the 
debates.
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Figure 1: Trends in GDP growth, savings and investments, 2000–2012
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Sources: World Bank META database.
Figure 2: Trends in financial sector depth, 2000–2011
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3.3 Efficiency, profitability and concentration
A key measure of  market structure and competition is the concentration of  
the banking sector. During the period 2000–2012, the share of  the top three 
banks in Kenya in terms of  total assets fell from 64.4% in 2000 to about 40% 
in 2012 (see Figure 3).  Overall, this implies that competition has increased in 
the banking sector. The concentration ratios in Kenya are also low compared 
to global standards (see Table 5).
It should be noted that several authors have attributed the poor performance 
of  the Kenyan banking system and African banking systems in general in the 
1990s – in particular the high interest rate spreads – to their high concentration 
ratios and oligopolistic nature (Ncube and Senbet, 1997; Kamau et al., 2004). 
As the discussion below shows, despite the increase in competition, interest 
rate spreads in Kenya still remain high.
Figure 3: Banking concentration, 2000–2012
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Source: World Bank Financial Sector Database (2000, updated 2009, 2012 and 2013).
Table 5: Global data on mean bank concentration ratios
2000 2005 2010
SSA 84.0 77.2 72.8
Upper-middle 64.4 64.1 61.1
High income 64.9 64.0 63.6
Kenya 64.4 51.6 42.9
Source: Authors’ calculations from the World Bank Financial Sector Database (2000, updated 2009, 2012 and 2013).
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Figure 4 displays the trend in banking sector efficiency. Interest rate spreads 
and interest rate margins are the most common measure of  bank inefficiency. 
The spread is often thought of  as a ‘premium in the cost of  external funds’ 
introduced due to informational and enforcement frictions (Gertler and Rose, 
1994; Honohan and Beck, 2007).30 The lower the margin and the spread, the 
higher the efficiency of  the banking system. It should be noted that there is a 
difference between bank-level efficiency and overall banking system efficiency. 
In using management theory, a more efficient bank would have higher margins 
and higher profitability. At an economy-wide level, however, theory suggests 
that in a competitive banking system, these profits should be competed away 
and hence lower margins and lower spreads are a sign of  overall efficiency of  
the banking system. 
Figure 4: Banking sector efficiency, 2000–2012
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Source: World Bank Financial Sector Database (2000, updated 2009, 2012 and 2013).
The figure shows that the net interest margin increased from 6.43% in 2000 
to 8.17% in 2011, and hence efficiency has worsened. Interest rate spreads 
decreased from 14.24% in 2000 to 7.8% in 2005, but have remained steady 
since then. In 2012, the interest rate spread was about 8.15%.31 This is the key 
intractable issue in the banking system. There is agreement amongst economists 
and policymakers that the interest rate spread in Kenya is high. Theory predicts 
that countries with greater financial depth have lower interest rate spreads, 
30 The net interest margin is the accounting value of  a bank's net interest revenue as a share of  its interest-bearing (total 
earning) assets.
31 Interest rate spread calculated as the difference between the lending rate and the deposit rate.
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yet Kenya has achieved an increase in depth with a relatively minor decrease 
in spreads (World Bank, 2013). However, two recent papers have highlighted 
that the determinants of  interest rate spreads in Kenya are still debated. While 
some authors argue that the unstable macro environment, including exchange 
rate volatility, contributes to the high spread (World Bank, 2013), others have 
argued that macroeconomic factors such as economic growth and inflation 
are not useful in explaining high spreads (Were and Wambua, 2013). Both 
studies emphasise the role of  internal factors such as overhead costs and high 
profitability, and both indicate that the larger banks in Kenya enjoy a higher 
spread. We will discuss later in this chapter the segmented nature of  the 
banking system in Kenya, as this partly explains why despite the increasing 
depth of  the banking sector and reduced concentration, interest rate spreads 
still remain high.
The profitability of  the banking sector (as measured by return on assets and 
return on equity) has been steadily increasing (except for dips in 2002 and 
2008). Figure 5 shows that return on assets (ROA) increased from 0.8% in 
2000 to 3.5% in 2011, and return on equity (ROE) increased from 14.2% 
in 2000 to 23.09% in 2011. Again, this shows that despite the reduction in 
concentration and the increase in competition, sustained interest rate margins 
and spreads have meant that banks are able to maintain high profit margins. 
Figure 5: Banking sector profitability, 2000–2011
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3.4 Banking sector stability
Banking sector stability is measured by looking at three factors: capitalisation, 
liquidity and absence of  non-performing loans. 
Figure 6 shows the changes in bank capitalisation ratios for the banking 
sector in Kenya for 2000, 2005, and 2012. It shows that there has been a 
small increase in all three important ratios: total capital to total risk-weighted 
assets, core capital to total risk-weighted assets, and core capital to total 
deposits. Furthermore, it shows that the banking sector in Kenya has a level 
of  capitalisation well above the regulatory minimums. The figure also shows 
that banks in Kenya are very liquid. With an average liquidity rate of  42%, 
the banking sector is well above the minimum required liquidity rate of  20%. 
Figure 6: Banking sector capitalisation and liquidity, 2000, 2005 and 2012
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Figure 7 shows that the key improvement in the banking sector in Kenya 
between 2000 and 2012 was the large reduction in non-performing loans 
(NPLs). The NPL ratio fell from an average of  37% in 2000 to 5% in 2012. This 
can be attributed to the stricter regulatory regime that was put in place after 
2000, the introduction of  credit reference bureaus and consistent economic 
growth over the period.
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Figure 7: Non-performing loans, 2000–2012
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Source: CBK Supervision Report (various years).
Another study, which carried out stress tests on the Kenyan banking sector 
using data from 2007 and 2008, suggests that the banking sector is resilient 
to shocks such as an increase in bad debt provisions by 50% and a reduction 
in performing loans by 50%. However, the extreme shock of  an increase in 
provisions by 100% would lead to 17 banks failing to meet the minimum capital 
standards (Beck et al., 2010).32 Furthermore, as the global financial crisis of  
2008 showed, high liquidity in a banking system can be an illusion that can 
quickly dry up if  all banks become illiquid at the same time (Davidson, 2008; 
Nesvetailova, 2010). While this may not be a concern for the moment, it 
may become more important as the Kenyan banking system becomes more 
integrated with the regional and global banking systems. 
3.5 Access to finance
The most significant impact of  the transformation of  the banking sector has 
been on outreach and access. While Kenya’s increase in financial inclusion is 
often told in terms of  the mobile money revolution, the increase in commercial 
bank outreach has been just as important. 
The latest FinAccess survey showed that the proportion of  the adult population 
using different forms of  formal financial services stood at 66.7% in 2013 
compared to 41.3% in 2009 and 27.4% in 2006. Similarly, the proportion of  
32 Data used to stress test the banking system are not in the public domain and therefore we cannot repeat these tests. 
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the adult population totally excluded from financial services declined to 25.4% 
in 2013 from 31.4% in 2009 and 39.3% in 2006 (CBK and FSD Kenya, 2013). 
Table 6 shows that bank access increased by 64% between 2006 and 2013. 
Table 6: Financial service use (percentage of adult population currently using)
Financial service
FinAccess 
2006
(n=4,418)
FinAccess 
2009
(n=6,343)
FinAccess 
2013
(n=5,849)
Banks 17.8 21.5 29.2
SACCO 13.1 9.0 11.0
MFI 1.7 3.4 3.5
MMT registered -- 27.9 61.6
Government 1.1 0.3 1.0
ROSCA 29.3 31.7 21.4
ASCA 5.7 8.0 8.8
Local shop 22.8 24.3 5.6
Informal moneylender 0.7 0.4 0.4
Employer loan 0.9 0.5 0
Buyer loan 0.9 1.2 1.1
Family or friend (saving or loan) 17.5 17.5 11.0
Source: FinAccess Reports 2006, 2009 and 2013.
On the supply side, the increase in outreach can be assessed by looking at the 
availability of  access points and the uptake of  accounts. For access points, two 
common measures are bank branches and ATMs, while for accounts the key 
measure is the number of  deposit accounts. In the period for which data are 
available (from 2004 to 2012), there was a marked increase in bank branches 
and ATMs both in terms of  numbers and geographic coverage (see Figure 8 
and Figure 9).
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Figure 8: Increase in number of branches and ATMs (per 100,000 adults)
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Figure 9: Increased geographic coverage of  branches and ATMs (per 100,000 
adults)
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During the same period there was also a six-fold increase in the number 
of  deposit accounts – from  2.5 million accounts in 2005 to 17.6 million 
accounts in 2012 (Figure 10). This growth significantly exceeded the growth 
in population, with the number of  deposit accounts per 1,000 adults therefore 
increasing from 50 to 662. As we will discuss in Section 4, this growth has 
mainly come from the large private banks.
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Figure 10: Increase in deposit accounts
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3.6 Patterns of lending
We now discuss the performance of  the banking sector in terms of  its 
contribution to the real economy. Figure 11 shows the contribution to GDP of  
three main sectors of  the economy – agriculture, manufacturing and finance – 
for 2000, 2005 and 2012. It shows that despite growth in the last decade, there 
has been little structural transformation of  the economy. The contribution of  
agriculture to GDP dropped slightly from 28.4% in 2000 to 25.9% in 2012. 
The contribution of  the financial sector increased slightly from 3.5% to 5.2% 
in the same period. A key concern is that the contribution of  the manufacturing 
sector dropped from 10.3% in 2000 to 9.2% in 2012. Meeting Kenya’s Vision 
2030 goals requires a structural transformation of  the economy, in particular 
growth in the manufacturing sector. A recent government policy document 
stated that ‘[t]he overall goal for the [manufacturing] sector over the next five 
years will be to increase its contribution to GDP by at least 10 per cent per 
annum’ (Republic of  Kenya, 2012). However, it is not clear that the financial 
sector is supporting this goal. 
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Figure 11: Contribution of sectors of the economy to GDP in 2000, 2005 and 
2012
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Figure 12 shows the change in structure of  lending to different sectors of  
the economy. Though agriculture still represents 25.9% of  GDP, lending to 
agriculture as a percentage of  total lending dropped from 8.7% in 2000 to 
4.9% in 2012. Furthermore, lending to manufacturing dropped from 21.4% 
in 2000 to 13.5% in 2012. The main growth in credit is reflected in lending to 
households, which increased from 3.3% in 2000 to 24.6% in 2012.  It should 
be noted that in developing countries, not all lending to households should 
be considered as ‘consumption’ or unproductive lending. It is known that 
people leverage their borrowing (whether from banks, microfinance institutions 
or SACCOs) to invest in productive areas, including agriculture and small 
enterprises (Johnson, 2004). A more detailed analysis from both the demand 
and supply side would be needed to classify what proportion of  household 
lending is used for consumption versus productive activities. However, overall 
the analysis does raise concerns that the changing structure of  lending does 
not reflect the overall goals of  the country.
Overall, this section shows that the banking sector has deepened, and has 
become less concentrated and more stable since 2000. Furthermore, financial 
access has increased significantly. The section also shows that lending to key 
sectors of  the economy, including agriculture and manufacturing, has been 
decreasing. This raises the question of  the extent to which the financial sector 
can assist in structurally transforming the Kenyan economy as envisioned in 
the Vision 2030 goals.  
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Figure 12: Changing structure of lending to different sectors in 2000, 2005 and 
2012 (percentage of total lending)
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4 Segmentation in the banking sector in Kenya
It has been recognised that the banking sector in Kenya is segmented and that 
this segmentation is the source of  low competition, inefficiency and fragility 
(Beck et al., 2010; Upadhyaya, 2011; Sichei et al., 2012). Upadhyaya (2011) 
shows that the poor performance of  the banking sector in Kenya in 2005, in 
particular the high levels of  non-performing loans and interest rate spreads, 
can be attributed to the segmented market. The analysis showed that each 
segment faced clients of  different size and type, and that this segmentation has 
a strong impact on the performance of  banks in each of  the segments in terms 
of  lending decisions and deposit mobilisation. The analysis further showed 
that segmentation is based partly on economic factors such as the size of  banks 
and structure of  ownership, but largely on social factors that determine the 
trust between banks and their clients. 
In this section, we analyse the performance of  each of  the segments of  the 
Kenyan banking sector in depth to understand their evolution from 2000 
to 2005 and to 2012. We show that there have been significant changes to 
the segmented nature of  the market. The gains in terms of  access in the 
last ten years can be attributed to the innovative practices of  banks in the 
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large privately owned banks segment. However, segmentation has not been 
completely eroded, and this partly explains structural features such as the 
persistent interest rate spread.
We use the same definition for segments used in Upadhyaya (2011) – foreign-
owned banks (FOBs), government-owned banks (GOBs), large private locally 
owned banks (LPOBs), and small and medium private locally owned banks 
(SPOBs). 33 Foreign- and government-owned banks are classified as such if  
foreign or government shareholding is more than 50%.34 Privately owned 
banks are classified as LPOBs or SPOBs based on an economic measure – the 
asset size of  the bank. Banks with total assets of  KSh50 billion (approximately 
US$580 million) or more are classified as LPOBs.35 This definition is based on 
the convention used by bankers in Kenya. The definition recognises that banks 
are segmented along both ownership and size lines. Furthermore, both size 
and ownership affect the perceived reputation of  banks in the market, which 
affects their ability to raise deposits.36 Key data points used are 2000, 2005 and 
2012. The year 2000 is used as a starting point as data at the bank level are 
not available before then; 2012 is used as the end point as 2013 data were not 
available at the time the analysis of  this chapter was initiated; and 2005 is a 
key middle point as significant transformation of  the banking sector took place 
after this date, with Equity Bank converting from a building society in 2004. 
4.1 Share of segments, 2000 to 2012
Figure 13 and Table 7 show the shares of  the segments in 2012 and the 
change in shares in terms of  total assets between 2000 and 2012. The figures 
highlight the stark contrast in terms of  market share and number of  banks 
in the different segments. In 2012, there were 12 banks controlling 32.8% of  
FOB market share. Even within the FOB segment there are differences, with 
the four main banks – Barclays Bank, Standard Chartered Bank, Citibank and 
CFC Stanbic – controlling 25% of  the total market.37 In the LPOB segment in 
2012, there were six banks controlling 34.5% of  the market and in the GOB 
segment, there were four banks controlling 17.3% of  the market. However, in 
33 A list of  banks in each segment is given in Appendix 2. 
34 In the case of  Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB), government ownership is not more than 50% but the government 
has a controlling interest through other shareholders, including the National Social Security Fund (NSSF). 
35 This is based on the mean exchange rate as at 31 December 2013 of  KSh86.03 to US$1. 
36 The Central Bank of  Kenya does not use ownership as a category but size. Large banks are those that control more 
than 5% of  total assets; medium banks are those that control between 1% and 5% of  the market; and small banks are 
those that control less than 1% of  the market. Beck et al. (2010) do carry out analysis by ownership, though defined 
slightly differently from this chapter. They use four categories: foreign, private domestic, government owned and 
government controlled. 
37 The other FOBs are smaller banks serving niche clients. 
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the SPOB segment, there were 18 banks controlling 15.4% of  the market. This 
stark difference means that the concentration ratio (discussed above) reveals 
little about the true nature of  competition in the banking sector.
Figure 13: Share of segments, 2012
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33% 
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17% 
LPOB 
35% 
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Source: Authors’ calculations from bank financial statements.
Table 7: Change in share of assets by segment, 2000–2012
Share of 
segments 
Share of 
segments
Share of 
segments
Difference 
in share
Total no. of 
banks in 
segment
Total no. of 
banks in 
segment
2000 2005 2012
2000–
2012
2005 2012
FOB 43.6% 40.4% 32.8% -10.8% 10 12
GOB 25.5% 18.4% 17.3% -8.2% 4 4
LPOB 19.7% 30.0% 34.5% +14.8% 9 6
SPOB 11.2% 11.2% 15.4% +4.2% 18 21
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 41 43
Source: Authors’ calculations from bank financial statements.
The key change that has occurred is the rising share of  the LPOB segment 
and the falling share of  both the FOB and GOB segments (see Figure 14). 
In 2000, the LPOB segment controlled 19.7% of  total assets in the banking 
sector. This grew to 30% in 2005, and 34.5% in 2012.38 The FOB segment 
steadily lost its share, from control of  43.6% of  the market in 2000 to 32.8% 
in 2012. Similarly, the GOB segment also saw its share fall from 25.5% in 
2000, to 18.4% in 2005, to 17.3% in 2012. The SPOB segment, meanwhile, 
managed to marginally increase its share from 11.2% in 2000 to 15.4% in 
38 The number of  banks in this segment has fallen as one bank was taken over by a bank in the FOB segment and two 
other banks were moved to the SPOB segment because they no longer met the classification criteria. 
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2012.  Overall, while banks in Kenya have generally experienced growing 
balance sheets since 2000, banks in the LPOB segment have pursued strategies 
that have either increased or maintained their proportionate share of  total 
assets. In the sections that follow, we discuss the portfolio characteristics of  the 
segments at a broad level and then discuss each segment in detail. 
Figure 14: Share of segments, 2000, 2005 and 2012
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4.2 Portfolio characteristics of segments, 2000 to 2012
We now discuss the portfolio characteristics of  the different segments of  the 
banking sector in Kenya. The dataset used for this analysis is individual bank 
balance sheets, with two data points: average for 2000–2005 and then 2012.39 
The indicators we focus on are return on assets, ratio of  capital to risk weighted 
assets, ratio of  loans to total assets, ratio of  government securities to total 
loans, total loans on total deposits, non-performing loans and cost of  funds.40
Table 8, Figure 15 and Figure 16 show the portfolio characteristics of  the 
segments and the changes in these characteristics between 2000–2005 and 
2012. 
39 It should be noted that before 2000, banks followed different reporting standards and therefore financial statements 
are not comparable. 
40 Cost of  funds is calculated as interest on customer deposits plus interest on borrowed funds divided by total deposits 
plus borrowed funds. 
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Table 8: Change in key indicators by segment, 2000–2005 and 2012
Segment FOB GOB LPOB SPOB
2000–
2005
2012
2000–
2005
2012
2000–
2005
2012
2000–
2005
2012
Return on assets 3% 2.5% 1% 2.2% 3% 4.9% 0% 1.9%
Core capital/
total risk-
weighted assets
27% 32% 23% 20% 25% 18% 30% 26%
Total loans/total 
assets
40% 48% 53% 56% 50% 59% 52% 58%
Government 
securities/total 
loans
117% 91% 26% 50% 38% 27% 31% 42%
Total loans/total 
deposits
58% 64% 153% 76% 82% 77% 158% 77%
Total NPLs/total 
loans
9% 4% 46% 8% 16% 6% 28% 8%
Cost of funds 3% 6.3% 4% 7.5% 5% 5.8% 6% 8.40%
Source: Authors’ calculations from bank financial statements.
Figure 15: Return on assets – comparison within and across segments,  
2000–2005 and 2012
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Figure 16: Core capital/risk-weighted assets – comparison within and across 
segments, 2000–2005 and 2012
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4.3 Foreign-owned bank segment
The data show that the FOB segment has contracted both in terms of  
proportion of  assets and also in terms of  relative performance. For the period 
2000 to 2005, ROA at 3% was highest for the FOB segment. In 2012, with 
ROA of  2.5%, it performs better than the GOB and SPOB segment but not 
as well as the LPOB segment. It should be noted that within the FOB segment, 
there is variation in performance. Two of  the larger foreign-owned banks – 
Citibank and Barclays Bank – enjoyed ROA of  10.4% and 7%, respectively. 
UBA Bank, a new entrant with headquarters in Nigeria, has a very poor ROA 
performance of  -13.6%. The FOB segment remains the most conservative 
with the highest level of  capitalisation, the lowest level of  lending on assets 
and the highest level of  investment in government securities compared to 
the other segments in 2012. Due to conservative lending policies, the FOB 
segment has historically had the lowest non-performing loan ratio, and this is 
also evident in 2012. Finally, if  we look at the cost of  funds, we notice a change 
between 2000–2005 and 2012. At 3%, the cost of  funds for the FOB segment 
was the lowest of  all the segments in 2000–2005, but at 6.3% it was higher 
than the LPOB segment in 2012. This increase was due the new entrants in 
this segment and increased diversity of  players. Barclays Bank, with its large 
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branch network and strong reputation, had a cost of  funds of  only 1.7% and 
Citibank had a cost of  funds of  3.7%. UBA Bank and Bank of  Africa, both 
new entrants to the markets and banks that are headquartered in West Africa, 
had very high costs of  funds in 2012 of  9.72% and 9.48%, respectively. This 
may reflect their lack of  reputation in the market.41 
Overall, it can be said that the FOB segment maintains a significant if  falling 
share of  the market. The segment also changed between 2000 and 2005, 
as there is more diversity within this segment with some new entrants. The 
discussion shows that even within the FOB segment there is variation of  
performance based on size, length of  presence in Kenya and location of  the 
parent bank, all of  which affect the reputation of  the banks. 
4.4 Government-owned bank segment
The data show that though the share of  the GOB segment declined between 
2000–2005 and 2012, the portfolio characteristics were much improved. In 
particular, the very high NPL ratio of  46% in 2000–2005 was reduced to 
8% in 2012.42 This is still higher than the NPL ratio of  the FOB and LPOB 
segments, but reflects the policy of  the regulator to restructure the banks, 
in particular the Kenya Commercial Bank. The liquidity of  the sector as 
measured by total loans/deposits also improved from 153% in 2000–2005 
to 76% in 2012. The ROA for the sector, at 2.2% in 2012, also improved. 
The main change between 2000–2005 and 2012 was the increase in cost of  
funds. In 2000–2005, the cost of  funds of  GOBs, at 4%, was higher than that 
of  FOBs but much lower those of  LPOBs and SPOBs. At 7.5% in 2012, the 
GOB segment now has a cost of  funds lower only than the SPOB segment. 
There is variation within the segment, with the Kenya Commercial Bank, 
the largest bank in 2012, having a cost of  funds of  only 4.6%. In contrast, 
Consolidated Bank had a very high cost of  funds of  11% and National Bank 
of  Kenya had a cost of  funds of  6.6%. In 2005, these two banks had a cost 
of  funds of  1.61% and 2.6%, respectively. 
Overall it can be said that the GOB segment between 2000–2005 and 2012 
improved in terms of  several performance ratios. However, its overall share 
of  the market was reduced and the segment also had reduced ability to raise 
funds very cheaply as it could in the past.43 
41 It can be hypothesised that these smaller FOB banks are not viewed by the market as foreign-owned banks but small 
privately owned banks. 
42 Refer to the historical section above for explanation of  sources of  high NPLs. 
43 This was partly due to a change in government policy whereby it is no longer mandatory for government parastatals 
to keep funds in government-owned banks. 
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4.5 Large privately owned bank segment
This is the segment that experienced the most significant change between 
2000–2005 and 2012. The segment’s share of  total assets increased from 
19.7% in 2000 to 34.5% in 2012. In 2012, this segment had the highest ROA 
(4.9%) of  all segments and the lowest cost of  funds, at 5.8%. This is the key 
change within the segments between 2005 and 2012. In 2005, FOBs and 
GOBs had the lowest overall cost of  funds, followed by LPOBs and SPOBs. 
In 2012, however, LPOBs has the lowest cost of  funds followed by FOBs, 
GOBs and SPOBs.44 The LPOB segment is also the least conservative with 
the highest total loans-to-total assets ratio of  59% and the lowest investment 
in government securities as a proportion of  total loans (27%), but it still has 
a low NPL ratio of  6%. Most of  the growth in this sector can be explained 
by the rise of  Equity Bank. In 2005, Equity Bank was the 13th largest bank in 
Kenya with a market share of  1.8%. By 2012, it was the second largest bank 
in Kenya with 9.3% of  the market.45 Equity Bank started as a microfinance 
bank and has received numerous accolades due to its focus on making financial 
services available to the poor and the ‘unbanked’ (Equity Bank Ltd, 2009). 
Studies have attributed its success to developing innovative products, including 
changing its fee structure from monthly ledger fees to a transaction fee-based 
model, ‘no-collateral’ loans, a customer focus, investment in human resources 
and investment in technology (Coates, 2007; Wright and Cracknell, 2008). 
Furthermore, Equity Bank used the agency banking model to increase access 
to finance.  However each of  the banks in the LPOB segment has made strides 
in either growing or maintaining its market share in a growing market (see 
Appendix 3).  For example, Diamond Trust Bank grew its asset share from 
2.72% in 2005 to 4.06% in 2012 by focusing on small and medium-sized 
enterprises. Overall, there is a need to study the competitive strategies of  
other banks in the LPOB segment to understand how they have been able to 
build their reputation and asset base so as to break the historical dominance 
of  the FOBs and GOBs. 
4.6 Small privately owned bank segment
We now turn to the SPOB segment. As mentioned earlier, this segment has 
over 18 small banks. These banks were able to increase their share of  the 
market from 11.2% in 2005 to 15.4% in 2012. Furthermore, they remain 
well capitalised. At 26%, the average core capital-to-risk-weighted ratio is 
44 Again there are differences within this segment. Equity Bank, with its large branch network, has a cost of  funds of  
2.9% and I&M Bank has a cost of  funds of  7.9%.
45 Refer to Appendix 3 for the changing shares of  specific banks in the LPOB segment. 
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lower than for FOBs but higher than for GOBs and LPOBs. However, banks 
in this segment still experience difficulties. They are not conservative, with a 
total loan/total assets ratio and a total loans/total deposits ratio very similar 
to the LPOB segment. However, with a ROA of  1.9%, this segment has the 
lowest ROA and the highest cost of  funds. Overall, this shows that the SPOB 
segment still faces significant barriers in terms of  competing with banks in other 
segments. Their inability to exert competitive pressure on the other segments 
has implications for increasing access to financial services, and partly explains 
the persistence of  high interest rate spreads in Kenya. While there have been 
changes in the nature of  the segmentation of  the banking sector in Kenya, it 
has not been completely eroded. 
4.7 Financial access and segmentation 
Table 9 shows the usage of  different types of  banks as reported in the FinAccess 
surveys of  2006, 2009 and 2013. It shows that the majority of  respondents 
use banks in the LPOB segment, followed by the GOB segment. These data 
provide corroboration to the discussion above where we showed the increasing 
share of  the LPOB segment and that this is primarily the result of  Equity Bank 
pioneering access to a wider market. 
Table 9: Financial service use by segment (percentage of adult population)
2006 2009 2013
FOB 2.7 3.5 3.3
GOB 6.2 5.2 4.8
LPOB
   of which equity
6.8
3.6
14.3
--
19.9
16.1
SPOB 0.7 1.6 2.8
Note: This represents the proportion of the adult population reporting that they are currently using a bank in the 
segment, it does not take account of multiple account use in the same sector. Respondents may also have an account 
in a different sector. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations from FinAccess surveys
Table 10 lists the top five banks and highlights changes in outreach between 
2006 and 2013. It shows that while the largest increase in outreach can be 
attributed to Equity Bank, Co-operative also increasing its outreach. Postbank 
lost out to the competition (it do not offer loans) and KCB expanded its 
outreach marginally.  
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Table 10: Proportion using specific banks46 (percentage of adult population)
2006 2013
Equity 3.6 16.1
Co-operative 3.0 4.7
Postbank 5.6 5.1
KCB 3.3 3.8
Barclays 1.6 1.4
Sources: Authors’ calculations from FinAccess surveys.
Supply-side data also reflect the fact that the increase in access, as discussed 
above, has been driven by the LPOBs, one GOB (KCB) and one SPOB (Family 
Bank) (see Figure 17). It should be noted that the agency banking model has 
been key to allowing banks to increase access to finance. As at December 2012, 
there were ten commercial banks that had contracted 16,333 active agents 
facilitating over 38 million transactions valued at Ksh195.8 billion (Central 
Bank of  Kenya, 2012).47
Since these data were collected, the Commercial Bank of  Africa (CBA) has 
grown considerably in outreach through its M-Shwari product embedded 
into M-PESA.  Recent data indicate that CBA has some 5.6 million deposit 
accounts, compared to Equity Bank’s 7.4 million, with an average account 
balance of  Ksh16,000 compared to Equity’s average balance of  Ksh21,445. 
However, CBA’s number of  loan accounts (879,000) now exceeds that of  
Equity Bank (840,000) (Ngigi, 2014b).  Loan sizes are likely to be much lower, 
however, given M-Shwari’s loan limit of  approximately Ksh8,000, and costs 
are high at 7.5% per month. This is revolutionary in the low-end market, 
although the actual profile of  borrowers remains to be established.  However, 
CBA’s enforcement mechanisms for these loans are currently weak and it 
reported in January 2014 that it had blacklisted 140,000 clients (16%) with 
credit bureaux (Ngigi, 2014a). 
46 Data for individual banks in the 2009 dataset are not consistent with other years and we therefore do not present 
them here.  Nevertheless, the data for the segments, which combine a number of  banks, appear consistent and have 
therefore been presented. 
47 The CBK does not provide a breakdown of  the number of  agents per bank. However, the three banks with the 
largest agent networks are Equity Bank and Co-operative Bank (in the LPOB segment) and Kenya Commercial Bank 
(in the GOB segment). 
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Figure 17: Growth of deposit accounts by segment
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5 Conclusions 
This chapter has traced the evolution of  the banking sector in Kenya from 2000 
to 2012. It shows that at the macro level, there has been significant progress in 
terms of  increased financial depth, reduced concentration, increased stability 
and increased access. However we note three main areas of  concern: the 
low savings rates, the lack of  credit to key sectors of  the economy including 
agriculture and manufacturing, and the high interest rate spread and margin. 
At the micro level, we focus on the evolution of  four different segments of  
the banking sector – FOBs, GOBs, LPOBs and SPOBs. It had been noted 
in 2005 that the first three banks to be established in Kenya (between 1896 
and 1910) remained the three dominant banks (Upadhyaya, 2011). Of  these 
three banks, two were in the FOB segment and one was in the GOB segment. 
The analysis shows that there was a significant change in the strength of  the 
segments between 2005 and 2012. Banks in the LPOB segment gained ground 
and managed to overcome the reputation barriers they faced in 2005. This 
can be mainly attributed to the phenomenal rise of  Equity Bank, but other 
banks in the LPOB segment also increased or maintained their share of  the 
market. This reduction in the historical dominance of  the FOBs and GOBs 
is the positive story of  the banking system in Kenya. 
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This change reflects the recognition, led by Equity, of  under-banked markets 
and that banking these profitably requires new approaches to operating. 
Competition for the low-income unbanked is mainly between LPOBs (Equity, 
Co-operative), with the mobile-enabled technology of  M-PESA now linked 
to banking with Commercial Bank of  Africa (CBA) via M-Shwari offering 
initial signs of  a significant shift in the landscape.  This competition is likely 
to continue to drive growth in the LPOB segment, which should also drive 
improvements in efficiency and thus reduce costs to make mass banking 
outreach a reality.  While disruptive innovation may arise from any quarter 
as mobile technology development continues apace, the current trend is 
producing a new segmentation between the LPOBs and the formerly dominant 
GOBs and FOBs, which appear unable to actively compete for this market, 
and raises the risk of  the low-income market becoming an effective duopoly 
between Equity and CBA.  
However, as reflected in the intractable interest rate spread, while segmentation 
of  the sector has in many ways been eroded, it is still present and there is a need 
to increase the reputation of  the banking sector as a whole, and in particular 
of  banks in the SPOB segment, to encourage full competition.
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Appendix 1: Main sources of data
Main sources Note Acronym
World Bank Financial Sector Database (2000, updated 
2009 and 2012 and 2013), 
Data only up to 
2011
WBFSD
World Bank META database (http://data.worldbank.org/
country/kenya, downloaded 15 Nov 2012 and 28 May 
2014)
Data up to 2012 WBMETA
Think Business Database TBD
Ashvir banks database ABD
CBK Supervision Reports CBKSV
CBK Statistical Bulletins CBKSTB
KNBS Economic Surveys EcoSurv
CBK and FSK Kenya FinAccess Surveys 2006, 2009, 2013 FinAccess
IMF Financial Access Survey (http://fas.imf.org/) IMFFAS
Indicator Note Exact source
Real GDP growth % WBMETA (row 823 NY.GDP.MKTP.
KD.ZG)
Gross domestic savings % of GDP WBMETA (row 840 NY.GDS.TOTL.ZS)
Gross fixed capital formation (gross 
investment)
% of GDP WBMETA (row 733 NE.GDI.FTOT.ZS)
Liquid liabilities/GDP % WBFSD (col G – llgdp)
Bank deposits/GDP % WBFSD (col M – bdgdp) 
Private sector credit/GDP % WBFSD (col L – pcrdbofgdp)
Net interest margin % WBFSD (col R – netintmargin) 2013 
data
Interest rate spread % WBMETA (row 495 FR.INR.LNDP)
Return on assets % WBFSD (col T – roa) 2013 data
Return on equity % WBFSD (col U – roe) 2013 data
Concentration ratios (assets of top 3 
banks)
% WBFSD (col S – concentration) 2013 
data
Total capital/risk-weighted assets (min. 12%) CBKSV for 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004, 
2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011, 
2012
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Indicator Note Exact source
Core capital/risk-weighted assets (min. 8%) CBKSV for 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004, 
2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011, 
2012
Core capital/total deposits (min. 8%) CBKSV for 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004, 
2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011, 
2012
Liquid assets to deposit liabilities 
(liquidity ratio)
(min. 20%) CBKSV for 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004, 
2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011, 
2012
NPLs/total loans CBKSV for 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004, 
2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, CBSV(2010) 
for 2009, 2010; CBSV(2011) for 2011; 
CBSV (2012) for 2012
Agriculture sector % of GDP EcoSurv (2013) for 2012; EcoSurv 
(2008) for 2005; EcoSurv (2005) for 
2000
Manufacturing sector size % of GDP EcoSurv (2013) for 2012; EcoSurv 
(2008) for 2005; EcoSurv (2005) for 
2000
Financial sector size % of GDP EcoSurv (2013) for 2012; EcoSurv 
(2008) for 2005; EcoSurv (2005) for 
2000
Lending to agriculture % (share of 
gross loans)
CBKSV (2012) for 2012; CBKSTB for 
2005; EcoSurv (2005) for 2000
Lending to manufacturing % (share of 
gross loans)
CBKSV (2012) for 2012; CBKSTB for 
2005; EcoSurv (2005) for 2000
Lending to household % (share of 
gross loans)
CBKSV (2012) for 2012; CBKSTB for 
2005; EcoSurv (2005) for 2000
Lending to financial services % (share of 
gross loans)
CBKSV (2012) for 2012; CBKSTB for 
2005; EcoSurv (2005) for 2000
Lending to real estate % (share of 
gross loans)
CBKSV (2012) for 2012; CBKSTB for 
2005; EcoSurv (2005) for 2000
Lending to trade % (share of 
gross loans)
CBKSV (2012) for 2012; CBKSTB for 
2005; EcoSurv (2005) for 2000
60    Kenya’s Financial Transformation in the 21st Century 
Appendix 2: List of banks and segments, 2012
Segment No. in segment
Barclays Bank of Kenya FOB 1
Standard Chartered Bank Kenya FOB 2
Citibank N.A. Kenya FOB 3
Bank of Baroda (Kenya) FOB 4
Bank of Africa FOB 5
Bank of India FOB 6
Ecobank FOB 7
Habib A.G. Zurich FOB 8
K-REP Bank FOB 9
Habib Bank FOB 10
UBA Kenya Bank FOB 11
CFC Stanbic Bank FOB 12
Kenya Commercial Bank GOB 1
National Bank of Kenya GOB 2
Consolidated Bank GOB 3
Development Bank of Kenya GOB 4
The Co-operative Bank of Kenya LPOB 1
Equity Bank LPOB 2
Commercial Bank of Africa LPOB 3
NIC Bank LPOB 4
Diamond Trust Bank of Kenya LPOB 5
I&M Bank LPOB 6
Prime Bank SPOB 1
Chase Bank (Kenya) SPOB 2
Family Bank SPOB 3
Imperial Bank SPOB 4
Housing Finance SPOB 5
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Fina Bank SPOB 6
Gulf African Bank SPOB 7
African Banking Corporation SPOB 8
Giro Commercial Bank SPOB 9
Equatorial Commercial Bank SPOB 10
Fidelity Commercial Bank SPOB 11
First Community Bank SPOB 12
Guardian Bank SPOB 13
Victoria Commercial Bank SPOB 14
Trans National Bank SPOB 15
Credit Bank SPOB 16
Oriental Commercial Bank SPOB 17
Paramount Universal Bank SPOB 18
Middle East Bank SPOB 19
Dubai Bank SPOB 20
Jamii Bora Bank SPOB 21
TOTAL INDUSTRY 43
Appendix 3: Changing share of banks in LPOB 
segment
Market Share 2005 2012 Difference
Equity Bank 1.90% 9.26% 7.36%
Co-operative Bank of Kenya 8.59% 8.57% -0.02%
NIC Bank 3.43% 4.37% 0.94%
Commercial Bank of Africa 4.90% 4.31% -0.58%
Diamond Trust 2.72% 4.06% 1.34%
I&M Bank 2.99% 3.93% 0.94%

The transformation of financial services in Kenya since 2000 has been 
remarkable. Kenya outperforms both the global average and many middle-
income countries such as Chile, Brazil, India, Mexico and Russia, with 75% 
of adults holding a formal account that allows them to save, send or receive 
money. This book explores the transformation with analysis of a range of 
new datasets by leading academic experts. The exceptional growth in mobile 
money, the emergence of bank agents, the expansion of bank branches and 
the growth of domestically owned banks are just some of the dimensions 
investigated in the book. While the Kenyan experience is unique, the story 
has great relevance for all emerging economies seeking to develop their 
financial systems.
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